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Transitions to 
democracy:  
what theory to 
grasp complexity?
Within the comparative analysis of democra-
tisations, the transition towards democracy is 
still challenging scholars and practitioners in 
search of more meaningful theoretical results. 
In fact, the process displays such a great variety 
of modes, aspects and events as to make it im-
pervious to every attempt at systematic descrip-
tion and explanation. If we consider the most re-
cent time span, from the early 1970s through 
to 2015, when, relatively speaking, the largest 
number of transitions occurred, successful or 
otherwise, the empirical universe to include 
covers all areas of the world. If we just take suc-
cessful or quasi-successful transitions, then the 
cases to be considered include at least: Portu-
gal, Spain and Greece in Southern Europe (3); 
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Bo-
livia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Nicara-
gua, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico in Latin 
America (14); Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Hunga-
ry, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in East-
ern Europe (12); Indonesia, South Korea and 
Taiwan in East Asia (3); South Africa, Botswa-
na, Namibia and Ghana in Southern and Cen-
tral Africa (4); and Tunisia in North Africa (1). 
This universe is thus made up of 37 countries, 
while the total number of liberal democracies in 
2015 is 89 (40 years earlier there were 43).1 The 
main questions we should address in these cas-
es include: First, are there key, recurring actors 
and factors we should take into account when 
analysing all these cases in depth? Second, are 
there recurring patterns of successful or unsuc-
cessful transitions? Third, are there one or more 
key recurring mechanisms that critically explain 
successful transitions? And, finally, fourth, are 
there obstacles which make it impossible to 
achieve a successful transition and which des-
tine such a process to failure?2
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Before dealing with each question in a specific section, some basic preliminary considerations and 
definitions are required. First, it should be made clear that this article is not an updated review of 
the literature on this subfield of comparative politics.3 Here, we are simply trying to respond to the 
questions at hand by recalling the available empirical knowledge; the quotations will therefore re-
late to the works strictly relevant for that purpose, in addition to my own work on the cases. Second, 
the phenomenon to be scrutinised is a process that unfolds over a span of time that: a) is impos-
sible to anticipate or predict; b) implies several interactions among actors and external conditions, 
which again are almost impossible to spell out explicitly. Third, the definition of the process can be 
simplified for the purposes of research feasibility by considering only the set of events starting with 
the breakdown of a nondemocratic regime and ending with at least the installation of a minimalist 
democracy.4 This means that I consider a transition to be successful if a minimalist democracy is 
achieved and to have failed if it is not. Any criticism regarding a kind of teleological definition and 
research would be off the mark as the aspects relating to changes towards democracy are explic-
itly and consciously singled out. Of course, the kind of analysis suggested here is necessarily an ex 
post one. If it had pretensions to being an ex ante analysis, then the critique of maintaining a tel-
eological, biased perspective would be appropriate. Fourth, the literature that inserts transitions 
towards democracy within so-called waves5 is largely misleading as it inappropriately lumps to-
gether several factors that need to be differentiated and highlighted, such as the role and impact 
of external actors as well as that of various internal, domestic factors and actors in individual cas-
es, which may differ from case to case in what is supposedly the same wave (see below). Fifth, in 
reconstructing the process, domestic and external actors sometimes cannot be adequately dis-
tinguished because of the dense interactions between them, but also because the very distinction 
between external and internal may be impossible to draw neatly on some occasions. 
Are there recurring actors and factors?
Once all the cases have been analysed, the most obvious and simple reply to the question con-
tained in the title of this section is “no”. But we do not need here to support a radical position, such 
as the one expressed by Whitehead, who views transition as a long-term, nonlinear, open-end-
ed process, and consistently develops an “interpretavist” approach, which “avoids spurious rig-
our and untenable claims of causal necessity”.6 Nor is it necessary to share the disappointment 
of Carothers when the new experiences of several countries are analysed and the need for new 
frameworks becomes evident.7 With the experience of these years of research, I believe O’Don-
nell, Schmitter and Whitehead,8 as regards the “transitions from authoritarian rule”, and Linz and 
Stepan,9 in their analysis of transitions (and consolidations) in the three main areas of the world 
(Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe), were and are still right to have chosen a 
methodologically moderate approach by adopting the well-known strategy of “multidimensional 
specific configurations”.10 That is, in each case a set of factors and actors should be explored, al-
ways the same ones, but in the end only a few of them will emerge as the key aspects, which are 
also differently combined and characterise each transition. If this methodological approach is ac-
cepted as the one that best understands and explains the analysed cases, then the most impor-
tant step is – of course, bearing in mind a number of hypotheses – to check all the cases and see 
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which specific configurations of factors and actors, taken all together, best describe and explain 
each case. This implies the development of theoretical frameworks, as O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
as well as Linz and Stepan, do. 
Alternative choices provide meagre results. First, as stressed by Geddes: “The basic problem faced 
by analysts is that the process of democratisation varies enormously from case to case and re-
gion to region. Generalisations proposed have failed either to accommodate all the real-world 
variation or to explain it.”11 Second, in another thorough overview of the literature, Bunce reaches 
fairly obvious conclusions, though distinguishing between theoretical propositions at a high level 
of generalisation and regional propositions.12 In fact, at a higher level of abstraction Bunce singles 
out five broad propositions, which basically recall previous classic analyses. The first proposition 
regards how a high level of economic development is a guarantee of democratic continuity; the 
second concerns the centrality of political leaders in the founding and designing of democracy; the 
third stresses the assets of parliamentary rather than presidential systems for “the continuation of 
democratic governance”; the fourth considers the salience of the settlements of “national and state 
questions” for “the quality and survival of democracy”; and the fifth concerns the key importance 
of the rule of law for a fully-fledged democracy. In addition, regional generalisations relate to the 
salience of “pacting”, that is, of reaching agreements and accommodation in the democratic tran-
sitions of Southern Europe and Latin America; the advantages of breaking with the past in Eastern 
Europe; the high correlation between democratisation and economic reform in a capitalist direction 
in Eastern Europe; and the threat to democracy in Latin America and postsocialist Europe because 
of the weakness of the rule of law. To strengthen the conclusion that “pacting” is salient only in a 
few cases pertaining to Southern Europe and Latin America, Geddes “found little evidence in a set 
of 163 regime transitions … for the claim that pacts increase the likelihood of democracy”;13 and 
McFaul shows that in Eastern European countries “successful democratic transition did not follow 
the pacted path” and, consequently, “in the long stretch of history, the successful transitions from 
communism to democracy may look like the norm, while the pacted transitions and transitions 
from above in Latin America and Southern Europe may look like the aberration”.14
Second, when considering “the state of art” in a more systematic way, as Berg-Schlosser15 and 
Munck do,16 they present and discuss a set of concepts and the main empirical findings in the field, 
such as: research concerning social classes as “prime agents” of democratisation is inconclusive; 
the explanations of democratic transitions are extremely varied; the old proposition about the as-
sociation between the level of economic development and democratic stability is still very solid; 
and the influence of international factors can be strong.17 Moreover, when switching the focus to 
international factors, they became a core feature of Eastern European transitions, through authors 
such as Whitehead, who points to the three mechanisms of “contagion”, “control” and “consent”,18 
or again Linz and Stepan, who discuss the salience of the foreign policies of other countries – the 
USA for one – together with the terms “zeitgeist” and “diffusion”,19 or those who have been conduct-
ing research into the enlargement of the European Union.20 Thus, on the whole, old generalisations 
are recalled or restated, but no theory emerges.
Finally, third, when including other contributions and research,21 the analyses proposed by those 
who have worked on several cases in Southern Europe and Latin America focus on the following: 
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the main characteristics of the previous regime; the important role performed by “pacts” or elite 
agreement on the institutions to be built (see also above); the role or “resurrection” of civil society; 
the limited role of political parties; the salience of contingent consensus on the institutions to be set 
up; the enormous uncertainties of the entire process of transition; and the importance of the first, 
founding elections. Put differently, what all these authors actually propose is a theoretical frame-
work that points to key factors to address when conducting an analysis of one or a small num-
ber of cases. In such a framework, actors, institutions, timing and the very notion of process play a 
central role in the analysis of countries in two geopolitical areas, that is, Southern Europe and Lat-
in America. Pridham also pursues a similar design by suggesting an appropriate framework for 
analysing mainly Southern and Eastern European changes as an overall phenomenon comprising 
historical determinants, modes of authoritarian breakdown, formal regime transition, the role of 
elite actors, economic transformations, the mutual influence of elite and civil society, the possible 
role of statehood and national identity in the transition, and the impact of international factors.22 All 
of these are aspects that should be considered together in the “dynamics of transition” when ana-
lysing specific cases. Schmitter ultimately seems to support this position when, to analyse tran-
sitions, he suggests taking the following into consideration: the immediate and revised situation, 
the possible outcomes and eventual outcomes, the available agents and “real-existing” agents, the 
potential and actual modes of transition, the prevailing international context, and the unit of gov-
ernment.23 On the whole, then, the approach of O’Donnell and Schmitter and of Linz and Stepan is 
the dominant path in analysing transitions to democracy.
When, more specifically, the focus in on explanation,24 the political traditions of the country stand out 
as a key factor. More precisely, the key variables are: the organisation and control of civil society by a 
hegemonic party and the consequent manipulated participation through which the regime was able 
to destroy the social structure and previous political and social identifications; the consequent so-
cialisation and resocialisation carried out by party organisations and other ancillary organisations to 
create new loyalties and identifications; and the suppression of the opposition. These variables were 
relevant because during transition they heavily conditioned the subsequent activation of a democrat-
ic civil society together with its social and political structures. In other words, an authoritarian regime 
that has been able to carry out effective policies of socialisation and suppression may leave a pas-
sive, weak, fragmented, poorly organised civil society during the subsequent transition. In this per-
spective, that is, the tradition of the country, an appropriate way of achieving a better explanation of 
different transitions (and previous authoritarian breakdowns) is to conduct an empirical analysis of 
those breakdowns and the characteristics of authoritarian regimes, as Geddes and her collaborators 
do by building a massive data set and reaching some conclusions to the effect that – for example – 
there is a higher probability of transition to democracy if the authoritarian regime is a military one.25
As stressed above in recalling McFaul, within the transitions to democracy that occurred in the 
different areas of the world spatial and time differences were also characterised by additional as-
pects, such as the change of polity boundaries and, consequently, of territory and population, as 
happened in several Eastern European cases, but not in the Southern European and Latin Amer-
ican transitions. Moreover, in the Southern European and Latin American cases the salience of 
economic factors has been totally ignored. These were highly relevant in Eastern Europe, while in 
Southern Europe there was no problem of changing the economy from a collectivist to a capitalist 
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system with markets and private property. But the considerable attention devoted to the relation-
ships between economic and political aspects in Eastern Europe has led some scholars to re-ex-
amine similar relationships in Southern Europe, as it was considered a mistake to think that there 
are no differences between an economy coexisting with an authoritarian regime and an economy 
coexisting with a democracy. With some exceptions,26 most analyses of Southern European tran-
sitions simply overlook those important aspects, and, to mention one feature, they largely glossed 
over the reshaping of the relationships between more or less organised interests and parties and 
between those interests and the bureaucracy with or without a large public sector in the economy.
To avoid confusion and misinterpretation, it should be added that over the years the connections 
between democracy and the economy have become a classic topic of empirical, behavioural po-
litical science, at least since the famous work by Lipset;27 and that, as stated by Geddes,28 Bunce,29 
Berg-Schlosser30 and others, the positive relationship between development and democracy can 
now be taken for granted. But in their analysis of transitions, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and 
Limongi very effectively spelled out that there is no linear relationship between economic devel-
opment and transitions to democracy.31 On the contrary, transitions are compatible with a wide 
range of economic levels, and there is only a definite strong relationship with the survival, if not 
consolidation, of democracy. A subsequent work by Epstein et al. tries to disprove these conclu-
sions by stating that “higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of demo-
cratic regimes, … by promoting transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems”.32 How-
ever, it only partially cast doubts on the conclusions of Przeworski et al. In fact, one of the main 
reasons why Epstein et al. obtained that particular empirical result stems from their classification 
of regimes into democratic, partial and nondemocratic ones, while Przeworski et al. preferred a 
dichotomous variable (democracy/nondemocracy). Although from an empirical perspective the 
addition of an intermediate regime makes sense,33 the key element is that in recent decades an 
imitation or demonstration effect has made the level of economic development much less sig-
nificant than previously, and this is well captured by the analysis of Przeworski et al.34 Finally, we 
should not lose sight of the focus of our analysis. In fact, the question does not concern the “like-
lihood of democratic regimes”, but the possibility of singling out the recurring actors and factors 
when analysing all cases in more depth. And economic development or growth is not a factor we 
always encounter. Thus, we are once again prompted to consider the “multidimensional specific 
configurations” approach. 
How did it come about that, with the additional aspects illustrated above, the approach proposed 
by Linz and Stepan became the dominant one? The first reason stems from a serious, methodo-
logically conscious reflection on the failure of functionalist theories, systems analysis, formal ra-
tional choice and other general theories, which were in “fashion” from the early 1950s to the early 
1970s. When submitted to empirical tests, those empirical theories displayed all their analytic and 
explanatory flaws, and were practically abandoned or subjected to a major overhaul with much 
better results, as happened in the case of rational choice theory.35 This has led to an evident search 
for different, maybe less ambitious, but empirically more solid, theoretical choices and conse-
quently better results. The awareness of this failure and the new directions have been thoroughly 
charted by several scholars, especially by Ostrom, when she stresses the need for “the develop-
ment of theory” in political science and, at the same time, the fact that what “we do achieve will be 
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limited in scope to specific types of theoretically defined situations rather than sweeping theories 
of society as a whole”.36
The second reason derives from the achieved awareness of the complexities and major differences 
between various cases around the world. Such differences extend to the temporal plane as well, 
even in the arc of a limited 40-year period (1974–2014) during which several profound social and 
economic changes have taken place internationally.37 Such awareness is additionally strengthened 
by the evident fact that in most comparative political research conducted in recent decades, democ-
ratisation has been the dominant leitmotiv, following in this respect the spectacular developments 
of reality: when the world’s five main geographic areas are considered, what immediately stands 
out is that hundreds of articles and books have been written on the topic in English alone, not to 
mention the ones in Spanish and various other languages.
Thus, on the whole, the variety of processes is so wide that the strategy of developing a broad theo-
retical framework is the only appropriate one, and any attempt to establish general patterns of tran-
sitions in connection with definite explanatory factors is bound to fail, if we also wish to avoid plati-
tudes. The dominance of the “theoretical framework” approach, for the reasons illustrated above, had 
a strong focus on transition and, at the same time, overlooked the related and partially overlapping 
process of democratic installation. I suspect that the simple reason for this is that in Latin American 
cases the installation process is short and very difficult to distinguish from transition, whereas in sev-
eral European cases the constitutional subprocess, the building of parties and the reshaping of inter-
est groups, allowed scholars to single out the process of installation more clearly. But O’Donnell and 
other specialists of Latin America were the most influential group of scholars when this subfield took 
off in terms of theory frame and research.38 A second possible reason for not breaking the analysis 
into two processes, which empirically overlap, stems from the fact that such a distinction would bring 
additional difficulties and unwanted confusion to already empirically complex analyses. Here, a differ-
ent opinion is supported, although admittedly a minority one in the literature. Going back to O’Donnell 
and Schmitter, their focus is on “transitions from authoritarianism”,39 that is, the point of departure is 
relatively well known (authoritarian regime) and nothing can be anticipated from the developments 
of the process. Consistently, in addition to the empirical aspects on Latin American cases, their focus 
has to be on transitions. When the phenomenon became more widespread with Eastern European, 
South Asian and African cases, the focus gradually switched towards “transitions towards democra-
cy”, where the point of arrival should be better known, but the one of departure became uncertain.40 
It could be an authoritarian regime, but also a traditional, sultanistic, postcolonial one. If the logical 
consequences of such a switching are consistently accepted, then there has to be also an analytic 
switch with attention also being devoted to installation specifically. Thus, the distinction between the 
two processes became more appropriate. 
Let it be added here that the analysis conducted on Southern European and Latin American tran-
sitions and possibly democratic installation has ignored the economic factors. Even though it is a 
mistake to think that there are no differences between an economy that coexists with a democratic 
regime and one that coexists with an authoritarian one, because of the inevitable and dense strands 
of interdependence, almost all scholars who have dealt with those cases have neglected these as-
pects. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, the transformation of the economic structures from 
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prevalently collectivist economies and their failure to capitalist economies with varying degrees of 
space for free enterprise and private property, has evidently been too wide-ranging and profound 
to ignore. Some authors identify three transitions regarding many Eastern European countries be-
tween the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, not only from authoritarianism to de-
mocracy, but also from a statist economy to one in which the market and enterprise play a central 
role, and, in some cases (Slovakia, the Czech Republic and even the former East Germany), from a 
certain territory and population to another territory and hence to another state entity.41
Are there recurring patterns? 
The approach of singling out a framework is not the only existing and possible theoretical choice. 
If a more limited time span and a more precise area is accepted, then more ambitious theoretical 
achievements are actually possible. In this vein, the main path has been the development of mod-
els or patterns of transition for a defined, usually small, number of cases. Over the years Stepan,42 
Karl and Schmitter,43 Higley and Gunther,44 Munck and Skalnik Leff,45 Berins Collier46 and Bunce 
and Wolchik47 are some of the main authors who have proposed such models. Some of the differ-
ences between them can be explained simply in terms of the different cases considered. For ex-
ample, Stepan and Berins Collier also include the classic Western European cases of the past in 
addition to Southern and Eastern European ones; Karl and Schmitter and also Munck and Skalnik 
Leff encompass the Latin American transitions as well as the Eastern European ones of the ear-
ly 1990s. The similarities between these attempts lie in the fact that all the authors quoted above 
mainly focus on two macrovariables: the actors of transition, whether authoritarian incumbent 
elites or those of the opposition, even at a mass level, and the strategies they pursued, either ac-
commodating or conflictive.
Thus, for example, Munck and Skalnik Leff come up with four models: “revolution from above”, 
when the actors of transition are the authoritarian elites who pursued a conflictive strategy of con-
frontation; “conservative reform”, when those elites chose agreements and compromises; “social 
revolution”, when counterelites were at the heart of transition and pursued a conflictive strategy; 
and “reform from below”, when counter-elites at the heart of transition adopted an accommodat-
ing strategy. The advantages and limits of such models are fairly evident and connected. One of the 
main points is that the more immediate understanding of a country is counterbalanced by a strong 
simplification of many relevant aspects. In addition, the adoption of mixed models is very common. 
Consequently, strong simplification is accompanied by a loss of theoretical efficacy that would have 
been, to some extent, rescued with the “pure” models. 
From their perspective, which focuses on a few postcommunist countries, Bunce and Wolchik de-
veloped a pattern of “electoral revolution”, which is characterised by four key features: a “conscious 
deployment of an electoral model of democratisation”; an “upsurge in mass participation also in the 
streets before and sometimes after the elections”; a “turnover in governments”; and an “improvement 
of democratic performance after the election”.48 The electoral model had a few favourable political 
conditions in the institutional legacy of the communist regimes (for example, the nonpoliticised army) 
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and was facilitated by the intervention of the international democracy-promotion community, who 
helped local activists. Bunce and Wolchik explicitly stress how: “The electoral revolutions that have 
swept away illiberal governments in the postcommunist region since 1996 reflect two sets of factors 
which are as important as they are difficult to disentangle: the favourable domestic conditions for such 
revolutions and the role of the international democracy-promotion community.”49
In the search for recurring patterns, an alternative to focusing on a limited time span and a small num-
ber of cases belonging to the same or a similar area is to pick one salient theoretical dimension and 
build a few related patterns of change or, here in this analysis, of transition. The most recent, relevant 
example is that of Della Porta, who proposes three patterns of transition on the basis of the role of 
social movements in it. Thus, there can be: an “eventful democratisation”, when a key role is played by 
social movements and protest in bringing about regime change; “participatory” or “participated pacts”, 
when social movements are also able to get reforms through a bargaining process; “participated coups 
d’état” or “troubled democratisation”, if élites manipulate mass protest to defeat other groups, even to 
the point of giving nationalist social movements a role.50 In the three patterns, the democratic result is 
not taken for granted. However, what is analytically salient are the “attribution of political opportuni-
ties”, principally with regard to splitting within the élites, and resource mobilisation, where the role and 
strength of civil society is crucial. The democratic or nondemocratic outcomes are much less relevant.
Other examples could be given.51 Here, to conclude this section, the different theoretical purposes 
of the two kinds of patterns or ideal type can again be stressed. On the one hand, there are patterns 
that propose a comprehensive view of each whole case where the result is the focus on a different 
set of factors and/or actors to explain the resulting pattern. Those patterns are circumscribed in 
terms of time and space. On the other hand, there are patterns or ideal types where one or more 
actors or factors is assumed as the most important one and the impact of it/them on the process 
or on the result is assessed and consequent patterns built. These patterns are much less delimit-
ed in terms of time and space.
Is there a key recurring mechanism? 
When dealing with this question, there is an obvious switch towards an explanatory goal. If the ap-
proach continues to be in terms of framework and multidimensional specific configurations, then 
each case will present its own explanation. However, albeit only rarely, explanations have also been 
attempted considering a large area, for example Latin America. Despite the fact that most of the 
focus of their work is on survival, stability and breakdown, Mainwaring and Perez-Liñan also deal 
with transition, devoting two of their five main hypotheses to it: first, a normative preference for 
democracy by important actors, such as parties, leaders or government, makes transition to de-
mocracy more likely; second, a regional environment favourable to democracy makes transitions 
to competitive regimes more likely.52 It should be recognised, though, that their real and outstand-
ing contribution is the sophisticated empirical analysis of Latin American cases over a long period 
in relation to survival and breakdown. Considering transition only, their hypotheses overlap with 
results already presented in previous literature (see above, Berg-Schlosser and others).
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Alternatively, on this question, the “rational choice”53 approach, with its focus on and search for “ex-
planatory mechanisms”, helps to provide an effective reply.54 The appropriateness of such a pro-
posal is that it may enable theoretical advances while, at the same time, not being at so high a lev-
el of generality that our statements become platitudes or pompous affirmations of the obvious, a 
trap which – as is well known – a number of rational choice contributions were unable to avoid.55 If 
the “solution” suggested by rational choice is accepted with its stress on theoretical priorities, look-
ing for causal or explanatory “mechanisms” still leaves some important issues open. First, despite 
the broader formulation by Elster, the core meaning of “mechanism” always brings to mind some 
combination of cams, gears, belts and chains, or at least a set of links or connections designed to 
achieve a certain outcome. In other words, a sort of determinism comes with the term, and this is 
unacceptable in our topic due to everything that empirical research has shown in these years, if not 
for another methodological reason, namely that attaching some sort of determinism to this term 
mutes a basic feature of democratisation phenomena: they are “open-ended” changes. Second, in all 
phenomena of democratisation, time, timing, sequences and identification of time-bound windows of 
opportunity are key aspects to analyse56 and, although possibly present within the notion of mech-
anism, time does not lie at the core of this notion. Despite what Pierson affirms about mechanisms 
that are or should be “temporally oriented”,57 the same author adopts the term “process” when the 
time to be considered is a long one.58 Third, however, when conducting empirical field research it is 
not always possible and is often difficult to gather consistent (fairly) complete data that is time bound. 
Thus, all considered, singling out empirical mechanisms is a potentially important theoretical step. 
But in addition we should embed the mechanism/s we are able to find into a meaningful “process”, 
where time, timing and sequencing, when singled out, are essential components.
Accordingly, at the core of empirical research there is the singling out of a “process” as a “set of 
recurring interactions among individual and collective actors within changing structures, which is 
spread out over time, may or may not unfold in an expected result, is on occasion unilinear, but is 
always open ended”.59 Inside this definition of process there is room for mechanisms minimally 
defined as “recurrent links or connections”. These definitions help to overcome a possible objection 
by Vanhanen and other scholars, who stress how “process-oriented analysis resorting to various 
proximate factors cannot lead to any general theoretical explanations, although they may produce 
useful descriptions of democratisation”.60 As a general theoretical explanation is actually impos-
sible, as shown by empirical research in recent decades, singling out key processes and related 
mechanisms, conceived as above, may be the best theoretical achievement to obtain. 
Moreover, such an issue helps to clarify how the oft-proposed distinction between “structure” driv-
en and “process” driven explanations,61 which usually focus on transition to democracy only, can 
be overcome: different interactions among actors and structures, to be considered as salient con-
textual variables, are recurring elements of analysis within transition or consolidation processes.62 
There is also no doubt that not only is there a random component in the actual unfolding of those 
macroprocesses, but they can be open-ended, often convoluted, and never teleological, as White-
head rightly stresses.63 To better understand this point, it suffices to recall that an individual or col-
lective action or set of actions, for example, an implemented political strategy, can be teleologically 
driven, but a process by itself cannot be such because it unfolds through several, often unexpected 
or unwanted interactions, even among different strategies, within a given or changing context with 
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again sometimes unexpected, unwanted results.64 In a different perspective, a simple point can be 
added: when analysing empirically the modes of transitions and installation, the best way of doing it 
is to focus on the actors, but when switching to explanations of behaviour and results with regards 
to the democracies that are effectively established, the role of structures, whether socioeconomic 
or of some other kind, can become a predominant aspect.65 
With this in mind, if the search for a recurring mechanism is at the core of research on transitions 
and installation, although it has received no explicit, direct attention within the literature on transi-
tion, the key question becomes: what ultimately is the mechanism or the key reason accounting 
for all those political changes that so greatly affected the lives of millions of people during and after 
the last decades of the twentieth century. If, despite what has been stated up to now, we have to 
try to suggest an effective reply, pointing to the “waves”66 can be mainly relevant for an analysis of 
imitation or demonstration effects, that is, on the one hand, it can be considered a partial reply for 
a few cases only and, on the other hand, it does not grasp the key, domestic mechanism to which 
the question is referring. Moreover, such a hypothesis has never been – and very likely cannot be 
– precisely supported by accurate empirical analyses: instead, it is an interesting persuasive hy-
pothesis bound to remain as such and which complements other, more relevant aspects.
The best reply seems very simple and, at the same time, difficult to detect precisely, but has to be 
mentioned as the main theoretical lesson to draw from the existing literature, our own research 
included. In recent decades, an effective learning process can be detected at the elite and mass lev-
els; this has been gradually spreading due to the failures of alternative regimes, such as military 
authoritarianisms in Latin America and communist mobilisational regimes in Eastern Europe, or 
even other civil-military authoritarianisms and traditional regimes in other areas.67 Despite specif-
ic events and unavoidable ups and downs, there has been a gradual legitimation of democracy as 
the most flexible and adaptable of all institutional arrangements, which is at the same time able to 
change the governing elites and to avoid the suppression and suffering of the people. Sen on de-
mocracy as a universal value68 and Sartori on the reasons why democracy can “travel” by setting up 
“demo-protection”, resulting in a free people not bound to suppression, and “demo-power”, which 
leads to a relatively more self-assertive people,69 point in the same direction.
In the final analysis, the thrust for political change stems from the people, who learn from their 
failures or by looking at what happens in other, maybe neighbouring countries, and change their 
attitudes and behaviour, with all the obstacles, distortions and changes of direction that such a cul-
tural transformation may involve. What we can see at work is a reaction of key actors, collective 
ones included, to existing, perceived legacies70 or new close-by realities, to cope with the present 
problems within a context of delegitimation of previous institutions. In this very process, learning 
emerges where past experiences and the present situation, also influenced by external events, in-
teract with each other with potentially different results, and where who learns what is often influ-
enced by chance.71 On the whole, and within Tilly’s perspective, such a mechanism brings together 
relational and cognitive features, but also an environmental one.
To better understand how the learning process actually works, a more precise hypothesis and some 
streamlined empirical references can be helpful. First of all, the salience of learning can be immedi-
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ately seen and analysed if there has been an important traumatic event in the country, such as the 
civil war in Spain (1936–39) or the overthrowing of Allende in Chile (1973). The transitions towards de-
mocracy in those countries and the moderation of elites and collective actors would be impossible to 
explain without paying full attention to that legacy. Again, it is impossible to explain the evolution of the 
Portuguese transition in the mid-1970s if the attention and influence of external events and the envi-
ronment are not taken fully into consideration. In Southern Europe a large number of citizens affirmed 
that they had been Francoists or Salazarists, but that in the 1970s and 1980s, in a different environ-
ment, they had accepted the democratic regime.72 If we change area and consider other Latin Amer-
ican or Eastern European cases, the learning process again emerges, for example, to best explain 
the Brazilian transition, where dealing with legacy was highly important; or the Romanian transition, 
which would be impossible to explain without analysing how domestic elites learnt about the exter-
nal context. But what about when there is no learning? Or rather, what are the obstacles to learning?
What are the obstacles to successful transitions? 
The fourth question, addressed in this section, could be worded differently. In failed transitions what 
are the factors, or even the actors, that have prevented transition by maintaining a nondemocratic 
regime, the previous or a different one,73 or by stalemating it in a hybrid situation? This question 
has almost never been explicitly discussed in depth in the literature, except in the work edited by 
Stoner and McFaul.74 A more systematic reply to it should refer to the three theoretical possibilities 
we explored in the previous sections of this article. 
Thus, first, if the theoretical framework approach is taken, then the explanation of the failure is in 
a specific multidimensional set of reasons that can partially or largely vary from one case to an-
other. Accordingly, the simplest reply is to refer to the lack of conditions and aspects that assured 
the success of newly achieved democracies. In this perspective, there is not much to say except to 
analyse the specific cases with a reversed framework vis-à-vis the one adopted for the cases of 
success. Second, if singling out patterns or models is the theoretical goal, then this is what Stoner, 
Diamond, Girod and McFaul actually do in the introductory chapter of Stoner and McFaul’s work 
(see above).75 In doing this they stress how a failed transition is usually an elite-led one, that the 
lack of three domestic factors, such as mass mobilisation, indigenous civil society organisations, 
and independent media and communications technology, is crucial to explain the failure and that 
the absence of any external international help for a number of reasons76 is also a salient aspect.
In replying to the question addressed in this section, the third theoretical possibility seems the 
most relevant and revealing one. In fact, if attention is devoted to the analysis of key mechanisms 
of change or, in this opposite perspective, continuity, then a few considerations are in order. To start 
with, when singling out the learning process as a key mechanism at the core of transitions, the 
actual question is how elites and people change their minds, or do not, and choose the democratic 
path. The basic reply to this question is: through trial and error. Elites and people learn the negative 
effects of nondemocratic arrangements and, with or without the help of external institutions and 
governments, can come to try out democratic solutions that eventually appear more favourable 
and acceptable for everyone interested. 
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Maintaining this perspective, however, prompts a number of other important reflections. First, as 
is obvious, the learning process may also work the other way: elites and people may follow other 
lessons and accept nondemocratic solutions, or simply obey them. If we look back over past ex-
perience, it is very well known how, in the early 20th century and later on, Southern European or 
Latin American elites learned to stop changes in a democratic direction by reflecting on their own 
experience or that of other nearby or related countries. 
Second, there are ideologies and beliefs that retain strong identities and consequently set up seri-
ous, tough obstacles to changes in the mindset of people. The two strongest obstacles of this kind 
that we saw at work are religion – in recent years Islam has been especially effective in this regard 
– and ethnic identities, particularly in several African countries. Such obstacles have usually been 
well institutionalised for years. This implies that beliefs and identities are powerfully strengthened 
by vested interests that support them. Of course, there are exceptional cases where a democratic, 
charismatic leader or small groups are able to overcome these obstacles. In South Africa Mande-
la founded a democracy in a situation where vengeance and conflict would have been broadly un-
derstandable and expected. With his moral authority and leadership abilities, he was able to win 
over other elites, other leaders close to him included, and even to bring about a change in people’s 
attitudes on the political direction to undertake. In Tunisia a democratic elite was able to find and 
follow a very narrow path by managing to have a mainly secular constitution approved in January 
2014 and laying the foundations for a fragile, but possibly viable democracy. 
Third, an unfavourable international context, such as being related to and dependent economically 
on a nondemocratic country – as happened in 2014 in the Middle East and the Eurasian area with 
postcommunist countries – and the related existence of an apparently successful nondemocrat-
ic alternative, such as a number of nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East or Russia, form the 
basis for the failure of transition, if started. 
Finally, it is difficult to forget one of the most obvious aspects. The most robust basis of a failed 
transition is set up by the absence of a democratic elite. In other words, even a charismatic leader 
or a minoritarian elite – although, of course, not strongly minoritarian – can manage to bring about 
a successful transition within a favourable context (see above). But the absence of that leader or 
elite and an unfavourable cultural and international context dooms any transition to failure. It is a 
platitude to recall that, despite the positions of a very minoritarian elite, the largest part of the elite 
and the people who were active during the Egyptian transition were not democratic, and their goal 
was a religious one, although characterised by varying degrees of fundamentalism.77
A few concluding remarks
The question addressed in this article is very simple: after at least four decades of transitions to-
wards democracy since the early 1970s, and various different pieces of research on this phenom-
enon, to the extent that an entirely new subfield of comparative politics, comparative democrati-
sation, blossomed in this period, what theoretical results have been achieved? In the early days of 
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the development of the subfield, the possibility of achieving accepted theories was very low and the 
overall prospects were gloomy, to say the least. In fact, one of the most authoritative statements 
on the issue was made by O’Donnell and Schmitter: “We did not have at the beginning, nor do we 
have at the end … a ‘theory’ to test or to apply to the case studies.”78 Several years later, McFaul 
echoed this statement: “the project of constructing a general theory of democratisation may very 
well fail … The unique patterns generated by the fourth wave of regime change in the postcom-
munist world suggest that the search for a general theory of democratisation and authocratisa-
tion will be a long one.”79
Here, to provide a reliable reply to the question above, the analysis was broken down into four more 
specific issues, to which each section was devoted. Thus, first, when asking if there are – and if so, 
which – recurring actors and factors we should take into account to analyse every different tran-
sition in depth, a double result was achieved: the best approach for the purpose was to develop a 
theoretical framework where all possible actors and factors are included and, when empirically 
tested, each actor and each factor turns out to be combined in specific multidimensional config-
urations; moreover, when over the years the focus switched more and more to democracy as a 
result of transition, consequently stronger attention should be devoted to democratic installation 
and related aspects.
Second, there are recurring patterns of successful transitions, and they are of two kinds with dif-
ferent theoretical purposes. On the one hand, there is the proposal of comprehensive multidimen-
sional ideal types or even typologies that characterise a small number of specific cases, usually 
very close in time and space, where the result is the focus on a combination of a different set of 
factors and/or actors. On the other hand, at a higher level of abstraction and with possible regard 
to a broader area and a longer time span, ideal types or typology are proposed where one or more 
than one actor or factor is assumed as the key aspect, and the impact of it/them on the process or 
on the result of it is assessed and consequent patterns built.
Third, if one shares the theoretical approach suggesting that the search for and detection of key 
mechanism/s is the most important theoretical result that scholars of comparative democrati-
sation can and should achieve, then, despite the problems and difficulties, at least one key mech-
anism emerges in the research on transition, which at least contributes to explaining critically 
successful transitions and indirectly suggests why other transitions are unsuccessful. This is the 
learning process, which is characterised by the interaction between past, perceived experiences 
and the present opportunities and involve both leaders and people. 
Fourth, especially on the basis of experience in the most recent years, singling out obstacles that 
make successful transition impossible can be done in connection with the different theoretical goals 
that can be set up. Thus, if referring to a theoretical framework, the failure is explained by the lack 
of conditions and aspects that assured the success of newly achieved democracies. If singling out 
patterns or models is the theoretical goal, then a failed transition is an elite-led one and the lack of 
mass mobilisation, indigenous civil society organisations and independent media and communica-
tions technology, as well as the absence of international help, are key aspects, above all in the recent 
postcommunist transitions. If the focus is on key mechanisms of continuity, then, in order to better 
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understand the basic reasons of failed transitions, four aspects should be kept in mind: a) the learning 
process, which was considered the key mechanism of change, may also work in the opposite way: 
elites and the people can work and opt for nondemocratic solutions; b) the two strongest obstacles to 
change are religion and ethnic identities, powerfully strengthened by vested interests; c) an unfavour-
able international context and the related existence of a successful nondemocratic alternative lay the 
basis for the failure of transition, if started; and finally, d) the most robust basis of a failed transition is 
set up by the absence of a democratic elite, which may also be a minoritarian one.
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